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Abstract 
The paper discusses the invariance view of reality: a view inspired by the relativity and 
quantum theory. It is an attempt to show that both versions of Structural Realism 
(epistemological and ontological) are already embedded in the invariance view but in 
each case the invariance view introduces important modifications. From the invariance 
view we naturally arrive at a consideration of symmetries and structures. It is often 
claimed that there is a strong connection between invariance and reality, established by 
symmetries. The invariance view seems to render frame-invariant properties real, while 
frame-specific properties are illusory. But on a perspectival, yet observer-free view of 
frame-specific realities they too must be regarded as real although supervenient on frame-
invariant realities. Invariance and perspectivalism are thus two faces of symmetries. 
Symmetries also elucidate structures. Because of this recognition, the invariance view is 
more comprehensive than Structural Realism. Referring to broken symmetries and 
coherence considerations, the paper concludes that at least some symmetries are 
ontological, not just epistemological constraints.  
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I. Introduction. The recognition that there is a connection between invariance and reality 
harks back to the Greeks. The Greeks made the fundamental discovery that underneath 
the flux of phenomena some invariant entity resides, like substance, which serves to unite 
the apparent flux. Modern philosophy of science has tended to give such purely 
metaphysical questions first an epistemological twist. Under the British Empiricists and 
Continental Rationalists, the Greek preoccupation with metaphysics turned into the issue 
of what the human mind can know about reality. At the beginning of the 20th century, the 
question received another shift towards scientific theories.  What do scientific theories 
tell us about the structure of reality? The Special theory of relativity (1905) and the 
Quantum theory (1911-1925) played a significant role in this latest shift. 
The theory of relativity rejected both the idea of an absolute, privileged reference system 
(like the ether), in which all bodies were 'truly' at rest or in motion, and the idea of 
invariant spatial and temporal measurements. These now became relative to particular 
reference frames, as do energy and mass. Quantum theory, in the standard Copenhagen 
interpretation, made the particle-wave duality dependent on experimental arrangements in 
double-slit experiments. The collapse of the wave function from the potentiality of 
permitted values to the actuality of measured values further chipped away at traditional 
views about material reality. With the rise of relativity and quantum theory the question 
of the invariant properties of reality occurred with renewed urgency.  
This is not just a purely philosophical question. It is a philosophical consequence of 
scientific theorizing. And so it is not surprising to find numerous scientists contemplating 
the age-old philosophical question regarding to connection between invariance and 
reality.1 They basically suspect that a link exists between frame-invariant parameters and 
what we should regard as physically real. I will call this the invariance view of reality: 
the invariant is regarded as a candidate for the real. Certain properties change from 
framework to framework, others remain invariant. The physicist wants to be able to track 
                                                          
1 Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics (41958), vii, §8.  Planck, too, regarded the constant in our 
worldviews as the real; see Vorträge (1975), 49, 66, 77, 291; see also Poincaré, Science (1902), Pt. IV, Ch. 
X; Cassirer, ‘Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie’ (1920), 12ff, 28ff, 34ff. The thesis is a common theme 
in many publications: Born, Natural Philosophy (1949), 104ff, 125; Born, ‘Physical Reality’ (1953), 143-9; 
Costa de Beauregard, ‘Time in Relativity Theory’ (1966); Wigner, Symmetries (1967), Feynman, Six Not 
So Easy Pieces (1997), 29-30; Weinert, Scientist as Philosopher (2004), Ch. 2.8 
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what does and what does not change under appropriate transformations. The 
mathematical tool to do this can be found in group theory and symmetry principles. The 
invariance view of reality is therefore more abstract and formal than the classical view of 
reality. The invariance view also sheds light on key issues in the currently fashionable 
thesis of Structural Realism. This paper will argue that the invariance view is more 
comprehensive: it naturally answers questions about the structure of reality and draws our 
attention to symmetry principles in pursuit of the philosophical question of reality. 
 
II. The Invariance View of Reality.   The Special Theory of Relativity generalizes the 
Galilean relativity principle and adopts the finite velocity of light as a postulate. The 
results are: time dilation, length contraction and relative simultaneity. The equivalence of 
inertial reference frames has many far-reaching consequences: energy, mass, momentum, 
spatial and temporal measurements become relational parameters. Relational means that 
particular values of certain parameters can only be determined by taking the coordinate 
values of individual reference frames into account.  If, for instance, observers in different 
reference frames, moving inertially with respect to each other, take different temporal 
measurements from their respective clocks, then time cannot be a feature of the physical 
universe. At least many relativists, as they were once called, arrived at this conclusion. 
According to Pauli (1981, 14-5) 'there are as many times and spaces as there are Galilean 
reference systems.' Quantum mechanics, too, was forced to treat many parameters as 
relational, as a direct consequence of the indeterminacy principle. For, on the 
Copenhagen interpretation, quantum systems possess no definite physical properties until 
questioned about them in a measurement process. Wave and particle aspects are 
relational to the measurement frame. And the degree of momentum of a quantum system 
can only be known at the expense of a renunciation of spatial knowledge; equally for 
energy and time. 
If the relativity and the quantum theory regard many parameters as relational, then they 
are not invariant across different reference frames. But neither theory stops there. The 
corollary of the relativity principle and the quantum postulates is that certain properties 
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remain invariant across all reference frames. The invariance view tends to regard the 
invariants as physically real. The invariance view is closely connected with symmetry 
principles. For if reference frames are related to each other by transformation groups, 
which keep certain parameters symmetric, then there are elements of structure, which 
remain invariant. This is just what symmetry principles affirm. Symmetry principles are 
of fundamental importance in modern science. They state that certain, specifiable 
changes can be made to reference systems, without affecting the structure of the physical 
phenomena. For instance, experimental results are invariant under spatial, temporal and 
rotational symmetries. Symmetries result from specified group transformations that leave 
all relevant structure intact.2  
In 1916 Einstein required that the general laws of nature are to be expressed in equations, 
which are valid for all coordinate systems. In the GTR general coordinate systems replace 
the inertial reference frames of the STR. Coordinate systems can be made subject to 
continuous transformations, like rotation and reflection. Such transformations or 
symmetry operations allow transitions between various coordinate systems. The group of 
invertible transformations is the covariance group of the theory. Einstein characterizes 
covariance as form invariance. He imposes on the laws of physics the condition that they 
must be covariant a) with respect to the Lorentz transformations (Lorentz covariance in 
the Special theory of relativity), (Einstein 1949b, 8; 1950b, 346) and b) to general 
transformations of the coordinate systems (general covariance in the General theory). 
(Einstein 1920, 54-63; 1950b, 347) The theory of relativity will only permit laws of 
physics, which will remain covariant with respect to these coordinate transformations. 
(Einstein 1930, 145-6) This means that the laws must retain their form (‘Gestalt’) ‘for 
coordinate systems of any kind of states of motion.’ (Einstein 1940, 922)  They must be 
formulated in such a manner that their expressions are equivalent in coordinate systems 
of any state of motion. (Einstein 1916; 1920, 42-3, 153; 1922, 8-9; 1940, 922; 1949a, 69) 
A change from an unprimed coordinate system, K, to a primed coordinate system, K’, by 
permissible transformations, must not change the form of the physical laws.   
                                                          
2 Van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (1989), 243; see also Rosen, Symmetry in Science (1995) Ch. I: 
Symmetry is immunity to possible change; Martin, ‘Continuous Symmetries’ (2003) 
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These transformations between coordinate systems occur against the background of 
invariant parameters. This invariant is taken to be physically significant. ‘The factual or 
physically significant quantities of a theory of space and time are the invariants of its 
covariance group.'3Although the covariance principle introduces a certain gauge freedom 
in the symbolic representation of the laws of nature, covariant formulations of the laws of 
physics are constrained by the relations between the relata in the structure of physical 
systems. Einstein’s demand that the laws of physics remain covariant – form invariant – 
means that the covariant expressions must refer to the same referent.  The referent – the 
physical relations between the physical relata in the structure of natural systems – 
remains invariant across covariant symbolic formulations of the laws of physics. 
The invariance view of reality seems to commit us to the view that frame-variant 
properties, like temporal measurement, are not real; only frame-invariant properties are 
real. This is in fact the conclusion, which many authors have drawn. 
Thus A. Eddington: 'All the appearances are accounted for if the real object is 
four-dimensional, and the observers are merely measuring different three-
dimensional appearances and sections; and it seems impossible to doubt that this 
is the true explanation.'4    
 
Equally T. Maudlin: 'the objective features of the world must be represented by 
invariant quantities.' Why? Because frame-dependent quantities 'change from 
reference to reference frame' and are, in part, artefacts of convention.5  
 
And M. Lange: 'If two frames from which the universe can be accurately 
described disagree on a certain matter, then that matter cannot be an objective 
fact.'6 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 Norton, ‘Philosophy of Space and Time’ (1996), 21-2; Friedman, Foundations (1983); Scheibe, 
'Invariance and Covariance' (1981), 311-31, 'A Most General Principle of Invariance' (1994), 510: 
covariance as invariance under coordinate transformations; Weinert, ‘Einstein and the Laws of Physics’ 
(2007)  
4 Eddington, Space, Time, Gravitation, (1920), 181 
5 Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity (22002), 34 
6 Lange, Philosophy of Physics (2002), 207; cf. Belashov, 'Relativistic objects' (1999), 659, 'Relativity' 
(2000).  
 5
Finally, P. Kosso: ‘The real is perspective-independent: symmetries amount to the 
discovery of reality in the appearance by understanding what is permanent in 
terms of what changes.’7  
  
How serious is this demotion of frame-variant properties to mere appearances?   Nozick, 
(2001, 329, note 11) points out frame-specific temporal and spatial measurements in the 
Special theory of relativity are not invariant, yet they are objective. Nozick’s point is that 
frame-dependent features can be both objective and perspectival. We can relate two 
aspects of the invariance view to two different versions of Structural Realism, depending 
on whether we reason from theories to the world or from the world to theories. 
 
• The Invariant is the Real. This is the epistemological part of the invariance view. 
It is the claim that invariant parts of theories correspond to structural elements of 
physical reality. It is a realist claim about scientific theories regarding the structure of 
reality. In terms of the recent discussion of Structural Realism (Rickles et al. 2006) 
the epistemological part of the invariance view should be recognizable as equivalent 
to one version of Structural Realism - Epistemological Structural Realism (ESR). For 
ESR claims that we acquire structural or mathematical knowledge of the physical 
world but that the underlying reality as such remains veiled.8 Our structural claims 
about the physical world are to be regarded as candidates for continuity in our 
knowledge claims, although this may not reflect an ontological continuity. All we 
know is structure – the relata are simply placeholders for the relations. Although ESR 
tells us that there is structural continuity in our knowledge claims – as reflected in the 
mathematical formalism - it does not commit itself as to whether these structural 
features are represented in the ontologies of our theories. In this respect the 
epistemological part of the invariance view goes further. It claims that there is a 
structural continuity between reference frames, which it expresses typically in terms 
of space-time symmetries. But significantly, it adds that what remains invariant 
                                                          
7 Kosso, ‘Symmetry’ (2003) 
8 B. d'Espagnat, La Realité Voilé  (2 1981) ; Worrall, ‘Structural Realism’ (1989), Chakavortty, 'Structuralist 
Conception' (2003) 
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across different reference frames is a candidate for the real. Consequently what 
science comprehends are the ontological structures of the world, even though in an 
approximate and idealized fashion. This modification will lead to a consideration of 
the status of symmetries (Section IV).  
• The Real is the Invariant. This is the ontological part of the invariance view. It is 
the claim that invariant parts of reality correspond to invariant parts of theories. It is a 
metaphysical presupposition in scientific theories about the structure of reality. This 
ontological part of the invariance view should be recognizable as equivalent to 
another version of Structural Realism - Ontological Structural Realism (OSR). This is 
the view that not only our knowledge of the physical world is restricted to structural 
knowledge, but that the physical world itself has a structural ontology. All there is, is 
structure. Proponents of OSR cannot agree on whether only to grant the relations 
reality or both the relations and the relata in equal measure. (See Rickles et al. 2006) 
But again the ontological component of the invariance view goes further. It 
distinguishes between frame-specific and frame-invariant parts of reality and derives 
this distinction from symmetry principles. It regards not only the relations but also the 
relata as real (at least in the STR). 
Many of the claims associated with the two versions of Structural Realism are anticipated 
in the invariance view and its emphasis on symmetries, and can be reassessed from this 
standpoint. 
According to the above-quoted interpretations of the invariance view the real cannot be 
frame-specific. In one sense modern science seems to support this interpretation of the 
physical world. According to the founding fathers of modern science colour is a 
perceived, secondary quality. A modern version of this view removes the reference to the 
observer and holds that colour is not invariant across different reference frames, because 
of the Doppler effect. (Cf. van Fraassen 1989, 275) That is, the change in frequency of 
electromagnetic radiation is a function of the relative velocity between emitter and 
receiver. So colour is not real in the physical sense. Equally for time and space. Temporal 
and spatial measurements in moving reference frames undergo time dilation and length 
contraction, respectively, because of the invariance of the speed of light and the 
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topological invariance of light cones. So, once again, they cannot be real in a physical 
sense. Physicists like Eddington and Weyl explicitly denied the reality of time as a result 
of the Special theory of relativity.   
Many of the inferences from the frame-dependence of properties to their physical 
unreality gain their plausibility from the insertion of observers into the picture. Many 
textbook formulations of relativity theory explain the theory by attaching a human 
observer to each reference frame. Observers have perceptions and perceptions are 
notoriously subject to illusions. So it becomes very tempting to treat the frame-variant 
properties as illusory, unreal.  
But in another sense there is something odd about this interpretation of the invariance 
view of reality. All human observers can be replaced by clocks and measuring rods. 
Consider a particle attached to a reference frame moving with a velocity of 0.8c along its 
positive x-axis. The particle releases a photon, a light pulse, at an angle of 90° in the 
positive y-direction. Now consider a second, stationary reference frame, in which the 
angle of the photon release is measured. At what angle, in the stationary frame, will the 
light pulse leave the moving reference frame of the particle? The answer is: at 36.9°. We 
should note that an ‘observer’ in quantum and relativity theory need not be a human 
observer. For instance, in the famous Maryland experiment (1975-76), atomic clocks 
were put on 15-hour-flights. When they were compared to earth-bound, synchronized 
clocks, it was found that the air-born clocks had experienced time dilation - they had 
slowed down by 53ns.  
Such examples lead to what may be called a reality paradox on the invariance view. The 
effects seem to be real in each reference frame: the measurements in each reference frame 
are accurate. The presence of observers is only essential for the reading of 
measurements.. Yet they are not invariant under symmetry considerations. So on the 
above interpretation of the invariance view, they should not be considered as real. 
Whether we consider the forward radiation of fast-moving particles or the time dilation of 
atomic clocks, we face a dilemma. Even under the replacement of observers by 
instruments, the measurements tell us that the frame-specific effects are real. Yet the 
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standard interpretation of the invariance view suggests that they should be regarded as 
illusory.  
ESR cannot avoid the paradox because it is only concerned with epistemological 
continuity of form, not content. It does not guarantee ontological continuity. 
OSR does not help to solve the paradox because its claim - all there is, is structure - does 
not tell us which aspects of this structure are frame-variant or frame-invariant, 
respectively. For all we know, all ontological structure may be temporally or spatially 
variant, failing to satisfy symmetry demands. There is nothing in OSR to exclude this 
possibility. But if we take OSR claims seriously, this is precisely what we wish to know. 
Which structures, amongst equivalent reference frames, remain invariant? To say that 
only structures exist, does not guarantee, paradoxically, that they are real in any 
physically significant sense. 
The clocks and rods urge us to admit frame-specific realities. But does this admission not 
fly in the face of the invariance view?  One way out of the reality paradox may be an 
appeal to perspectivalism: many of the relational parameters, like mass, energy, time, are 
real within a specific reference frame only.  However, perspectivalism must not be made 
an observer-dependent notion. Observers impose the double burden of relativism or 
idealism. We know that we can replace all observers by rods, light signals and atomic 
oscillations and the reference frames will still register relational parameters. 
Significantly, perspectivalism must incorporate the relativistic insight that these reference 
frames are connected to each other by symmetry transformations. The laws of physics do 
not apply to specific reference frames. Reference frames are connected by space-time 
symmetries, which implies that there must be invariant properties. 
Let us see how such a perspectival view of invariance would deal with the issues at hand. 
Consider again the photon angle in the forward radiation of fast moving particles. What is 
invariant here is what governs these phenomena. It is equation (1), relating the angles in 
the two reference frames9: 
                                                          
9 Sexl/Schmidt, Raum-Zeit-Relativität (1978), 106; Bohm, Special Theory of Relativity (1965), 77-80; 
Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections (1967), 53-7. The parameter ε represents the angle as seen in the 
laboratory, the ε’ represents the angle in the photon system. 
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The equation expresses the underlying structure. What the moving particle 'sees' and what 
the lab instrument 'observes' are only perspectival aspects. They are real from their 
perspectival points of view. As all reference to observers can be extirpated from the 
consideration of reference-frames, can we avoid the paradox of reality? We can relate 
perspectivalism to supervenience, understood as a physical relation. For instance, as 
Oersted observed, an electric current in a wire produces a magnetic field; and as Faraday 
discovered, a magnetic flux induces an electric current. Oersted’s magnetic field and 
Faraday’s current are examples of supervenient properties in a purely physical sense. 
Supervenience requires the co-variation of a physical base (the underlying structure) with 
a supervenient domain (the frame-specific realities) and a dependence relation. The 
frame-specific realities are supervenient on the frame-independent realities, in the sense 
that a variation of coordinates changes the measurement of temporal and spatial lengths, 
whilst the space-time interval ‘ds’ remains invariant across all coordinate systems.  The 
frame-specific appearances are physically dependent on the frame-invariant structures. 
Yet they are real, but not in an observer-dependent sense. Perspectivalism is not 
observer-dependent but frame-dependent. The perspectival realities of physics are the 
result of a combination of particular reference frames with frame-invariant underlying 
structures. Equation (1) expresses the invariant of forward radiation - or the structure, 
which we regard as physically real, in a non-perspectival sense. Faraday's law of 
magnetic flux expresses the underlying structure of the physical base, which leads to the 
flow of current. In the case of the Lorentz contraction, it is the underlying space-time 
structure, which we regard, under this criterion, as physically real because it is invariant 
under external symmetries. But it looks as if we had simply shifted the problem from 
perspectival realities to the question of the existence of invariant structure. According to 
Structural Realism structure consists of relata and relations, although in many versions of 
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Structural Realism, the relata are regarded as mere placeholders, whilst the relations are 
primary. The invariance view reveals that there is more to structure than relata and 
relations. There exists in fact a close affinity between structures and systems. Let us first 
see what symmetries tell us about structure (Section III) and then consider the reality of 
structures (Section IV). 
 
III. Symmetries & Structure. A structure consists of relata and relations, both of which 
can be frame-specific or frame-invariant. It is existing relations, which hold the relata 
together and bind them into specific structures. The physical manifestation of a structure 
is a natural system. A system, like the solar system, consists of relata (the planetary 
bodies and the sun) and relations (Kepler’s or Newton's laws). The relations prescribe the 
elliptical orbits of the relata. Frame-specific realities may not be physically interesting, 
for two reasons: 
1. In some cases, a change of reference frame can make these apparent realities 
disappear: as the asymmetry in the observable phenomena, depending on whether 
the magnet or the conductor is moving, as Einstein pointed out at the beginning of 
his 1905 paper. It is also the basis for Einstein’s argument against the reality of 
gravitation in his famous thought experiment, which establishes the equivalence 
between inertial and gravitational mass. 
2. In other cases, the frame-specific parameters do not disappear but vary in value 
with a change of reference system. The time registered by two clocks in relative 
inertial motion to each other, does not disappear, as we change reference system, 
nor does it stay the same. These are therefore supervenient, perspectival realities. 
 
Physics is interested in frame-invariant realities, because the frame-specific realities can 
be obtained from them by transformation rules and symmetry principles. Frame-
invariance therefore helps the unification process. How can we get hold of frame-
invariant realities if all our experience of reality seems perspectival? It is the symmetries, 
which will help us pin them down. Symmetries result from the application of 
transformation groups of the theory of relativity, which will leave all relevant parameters 
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unchanged. Relevant parameters are those, which prove to be immune to the possible 
changes expressed in symmetry operations, applied to coordinate systems.  
Symmetries can be distinguished according to different properties.10 Rotation, reflection, 
spatial and temporal translations and space-time symmetries are typical geometric 
symmetries. They take events, things and properties as their objects. A better name may 
be external (global) symmetries. External symmetries result from the application of 
space-time transformation groups. They are external to their reference objects because 
they govern the invariance of their objects with respect to an 'external' change of space-
time reference systems. So according to the Galileo transformations, an event that 
happens at a location x, can equally be transported to a location x', because the two 
locations are related by the equation x' = x - vt. Whatever event takes place at location x, 
its physical nature will not change as a result of its transport to x'. In the relativistic case 
the Lorentz transformations apply. 
 
Gauge symmetries like the charge-parity symmetry in certain particle interactions are 
representatives of the newer dynamic symmetries. They take electromagnetic, 
gravitational, weak and strong interactions between elementary particles as their objects. 
A better name may be internal (local) symmetries. Internal symmetries are combined into 
gauge groups. They govern the internal symmetry of ‘physical interactions', as for 
instance in the transformation of the electric and magnetic field vectors of charges as we 
go from stationary to moving systems. Local gauge symmetries obtain in quantum 
mechanics. For instance, the wave function of a charged particle, Ψ, can undergo a phase 
shift:    
ΔΨ=Ψ ie'  (2), 
which will not affect the equation of motion, nor the square of the wave function: 
22' Ψ=Ψ  (3). 
                                                          
10 Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections (1967); Morrison, ‘Symmetries as Meta-Laws’ (1995); Rosen, 
Symmetry in Science (1995), 72-6; Earman, World Enough (1989), 173; Mainzer, Symmetries (1996), 277, 
341f, 357, 414, 420 calls dynamic symmetries ‘gauge groups’; Encyclopaedia of Physics (Article 
'Symmetry Laws'); Cao, Conceptual Development (1997), Ch. 9 
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 The famous violation of parity in weak interactions is a further example of how 
invariance under a group of local transformations (gauge symmetry) can be obtained. 
They are not invariant under charge reversal, C, or space inversion, P, but they are 
invariant under their combined operation, CP, and under time reversal, T. We will use the 
CPT symmetry as an argument for the ontological significance of symmetries. 
 
Considerations of symmetries tell us that the traditional characterization of structure as 
'relata + relations' cannot be restricted to lawlike physical relations between events and 
objects. Amongst the relations we have to count symmetries. The relata (fields, objects, 
properties, reference frames) are governed by their relations (laws of nature, symmetry 
principles).  That makes the relations structural principles: for the relata to be governed 
by the relations means for the relations to put constraints on the relata - structural 
constraints since they determine the type of relata, which are allowed to enter the 
relations. The relations will act as constraints on the placeholders: they will only allow 
specific types of placeholders into the relations. But the relations themselves are 
governed by symmetry principles. Amongst the relations, we find conservation laws, and 
these follow from symmetry principles, according to Noether’s theorem.11 They are 
higher-order principles. If the symmetries preserve structure, then they are constraints on 
structure. In the first instance, we may regard the structure as consisting of relations and 
relata, but symmetries are higher-order constraints on relata and relations.  As higher-
order principles the symmetries give us - barring some further considerations below - the 
invariant structures, in which physics is interested. We can, in Leibnizian fashion, adopt a 
relational approach to structure.12 Such an approach emphasises that structure is born of 
                                                          
11 According to Noether's theorem symmetries and conservation laws are related. The laws of conservation 
are consequences of the space-time symmetry operations. Conservation of momentum results from 
invariance with respect to spatial translations, conservation of energy from invariance with respect to 
temporal translation, conservation of angular momentum from invariance with respect to spatial rotation 
and conservation of the centre of mass from invariance with respect to uniform motions. See Mainzer, 
Symmetries of Nature (1996), 350; Feynman, 6 Not So Easy Pieces (1997), 29-30; Rosen, Symmetries 
(1995), 150-3, Wigner, Symmetries (1967), 18ff 
12 As St. French shows in his ‘Eddington’s Structuralist Conception of Objects’ (2003), Arthur Eddington 
adopted such a relational approach to structure in the early 20th century; cf. French/Ladyman, ‘Remodelling 
Structural Realism’ (2003) 
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a union of relata and relations. As soon as we place two atoms into an empty universe, we 
have a triad of relata, relations and symmetries. The triad is embedded in the natural 
world, which consists of interrelated systems.  
Given appropriate constraints, structures tend to be frame-invariant. But structure also 
has frame-variant perspectival manifestations. The relations between relata themselves 
may not be structure-preserving, as for instance the distance between two objects may 
change, while the Euclidean distance, r2, remains the same. From the viewpoint adopted 
here, the philosophical debate on Structural Realism has neglected two important aspects: 
the role of symmetries in the determination of both perspectival and invariant features. 
We can see that perspectivalism and invariance are two faces of symmetries. Symmetries 
offer a deeper insight into the nature of reality, because they automatically yield frame-
specific (perspectival) and frame-invariant properties of physical reality. A consideration 
of symmetries therefore anticipates many features of Structural Realism.  
As we have seen, Structural Realism comes in competing versions, which appear as two 
different faces of the invariance view. As the epistemological thesis that the invariant is 
the real the invariance view makes a theoretical claim about the structure of reality. Such 
claims to reality have been typical of scientific theories from geocentrism to string 
theory. Above we called the ontological thesis that the real is the invariant a metaphysical 
presupposition. But even metaphysical presuppositions can change as a result of scientific 
discoveries, as the transition from absolute to relative simultaneity demonstrates. 
(Weinert 2004, Ch. 4) According to the relational view of structure, relata and relations 
interrelate in such a way that it can be misleading to claim that structures are prior to 
relata (as some versions of OSR do). Events, objects and properties are needed as inputs 
to structures.  The question is whether certain structures are invariant. This is determined 
by symmetry principles. But invariant structures also need the input of relata. Relativity 
theory tended to feed 4-dimensional events into the structures, while quantum theory took 
invariant properties of quantum systems (e.g. spin) as inputs. Modern theories of 
quantum gravity reach for a deeper level. In string theory the fundamental objects appear 
as strings or membranes, in loop quantum theory as fundamental loops. Philosophy 
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cannot prejudge the fundamental ontology, which theoretical physics is unearthing, by 
declaring that all is structure. To elucidate the nature of structure, we should now 
consider how the invariance view offers possibilities of testing invariance through the 
perspectival nature of our observations and experiments. 
 
IV. Symmetries & Invariance. To say that an equation represents a mathematical 
structure does not per se help to decide between ESP and OSR. Equations are just 
structural principles, which may either tell us something about the structure of our 
knowledge, as ESR claims, or the structure of the physical world, as OSR claims. There is 
no need to postulate that structures are real. The symmetries already give us frame-
invariant and frame-variant structures. But this just shifts the argument to the question 
whether symmetries reflect real or only epistemological structures. Some have argued 
that symmetry principles must be construed as constraints on epistemological structures. 
(Morrison 1995; van Fraassen 1989, Pt. III, Ch. 10) If symmetries are merely constraints 
on epistemological structure, then symmetries add nothing of empirical content to the 
elements, on which they operate. And it is certainly foolish to regard every piece of 
mathematical structure as reflecting some reality.  
 
Consider nothing more than the Galilean fall law: 
2
2
1 gttvy o −=Δ   (4) 
and assume that the height Δy = 240m, the velocity, vo = 40m/s and g ≈ 10m/s2, which 
after some rearrangement and unit cancellation, yields: 
04882 =−− tt    
( )( ) 0412 =+− tt    
so that either t1 = 12s or t2  = ¬ 4s; but t2 is not regarded as a physical solution so that the 
time of flight, t1, is 12 seconds. 
On the other hand, we have already seen that symmetries, by virtue of being higher order 
principles, are interrelated with the relata and the relations. The system of relata and 
relations are not regarded as purely epistemological objects in physics but as grounded in 
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the real world. In other words there is the strong warranted belief that the natural world 
exists independently of its observers. If the natural systems in the physical world display 
various kinds of structure, then scientific theories must represent this structure through 
various models. But if symmetries are interrelated with the relata and the relations, it is 
reasonable to expect that they are more than constraints on epistemological structures; 
they are grounded, via this interrelation, in the physical world. It is through this route that 
the principle of covariance gains empirical significance. This grounding must be based on 
observational and experimental phenomena to prevent that every symmetry, by default, 
becomes an ontological chunk of the world. As symmetries are prima facie 
epistemological objects, we are operating within the epistemological arm of the 
invariance view: the invariant is (a candidate for) the real. If we can argue that 
symmetries must be more than constraints on epistemological structure, we may conclude 
that the world consists of ontological structures. 
There are at least two arguments in favour of treating symmetries as more than 
constraints on epistemological structure. We may restrict our attention here to symmetries 
whose candidate status for the real has some empirical credibility. That is, we restrict 
attention to symmetries, which can be connected to experimental and observational data. 
So we can bracket the appearance of symmetries in theories, which themselves have no 
empirical backing at this stage. For instance, string theory postulates new symmetries, so-
called dualities: the winding modes for a circular universe of radius R are the same as the 
vibration modes for a circular universe of radius 1/R and vice versa. These two universes 
are physically indistinguishable. Whilst these are considered to be important 
epistemological constraints on different versions of string theory, they cannot be regarded 
as ontological constraints, since string theory is (still) thoroughly empirically 
underdetermined.  
1) One argument in favour of the view that certain symmetries are part and parcel of the 
furniture of the world comes from the observation of broken symmetries. The argument is 
based on a classic falsificationist move. Every lab-based experiment confirms that 
external symmetries hold good in a finite number of spatio-temporal locations. Yet it is 
not possible to confirm that all phenomena in nature are subject to symmetry principles. 
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The reason is the asymmetry of verification and falsification. But we can learn something 
about the structure of nature from the experimentally confirmed phenomenon of broken 
symmetries. The most famous example is the violation of parity symmetry in weak 
interactions.13 C. S. Wu (1957) discovered parity non-conservation in beta decay of 
. Soon afterwards parity non-conservation was observed in meson decay (Garwin 
1957) and hyperon decay (Crawford 1957). Generally, electromagnetic interactions 
display parity invariance or invariance under space reflection. Weak interactions, 
however, display a preference for chirality: right- or left-handedness. Parity invariance is 
violated in weak interactions. Wu took up a suggestion by Lee and Yang to measure the 
angular distribution of electrons in beta decay (of polarized ):  
 
60CO
CO60
60CO
eeNi ν++→ ¬60
Let θ be the angle between the orientation of the parent nuclei and the momentum of 
electrons. Wu and her coworkers observed an asymmetry in the distribution of electron 
momentum parallel and anti-parallel to the nucleus spin. The asymmetry of beta particle 
emission was dependent on the direction of the magnet field, H. The asymmetry showed 
that parity was not conserved in beta decay. ‘If an asymmetry in the distribution between 
θ and 180° - θ (…) is observed’, they write, ‘it provides unequivocal proof that parity is 
not conserved in beta decay. The asymmetry effect has been observed in the case of 
oriented  ' (Wu 1957, 1413). 60CO
To illustrate the violation of parity in weak interactions, consider the  meson decay:  +π
.μνμπ +→ ++  
Wu’s experiment showed that in weak decay processes particles are emitted with left-
handedness, anti-particles with right-handedness. (Figure Ia,b) 
 
                                                          
13 C. S. Wu, 'Parity Conservation' (1957); H. R. Quinn/M.S. Witherell, 'The Asymmetry between Matter 
and Anti-Matter' (2003); Feynman, Six Not So Easy Pieces (1997), Ch. 2.4-2.9; Weinberg, Dreams of Final 
Theory (1993); Morrison, 'The Overthrow of Parity' (1957) 
 
 
 
 17
Figure Ib: When charge is 
reversed, parity is restored, 
(bottom right, Fig. Ib).  The 
meson π- decays into an anti-
muon neutrino and a muon , 
μ- . Meson decay is invariant 
under the simultaneous 
change of parity and charge: 
CP invariance. 
 Figure Ia: Meson decay: the π+ decays into 
the μ+ (anti-muon) and νμ  (muon neutrino), 
which are only emitted with left-handedness. 
Because of conservation laws, their spins are 
opposite but both particles have left-handed 
chirality. Parity is violated, since the mirror 
image (top right in Fig. Ib) does not occur; 
only left-handed leptons participate in weak 
interactions. 
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The violation of parity symmetry in weak interactions is therefore a strong indication of 
the existence of CP-invariance in nature, and by inference to the existence of unbroken 
parity symmetry in all strong interactions. In 1965 it was found that such decay processes 
are not invariant under reversal of temporal order. The combination of C, P, and T, 
however, restored invariance. The so-called CPT theorem shows that a quantum field 
theory must obey CPT symmetry if it obeys Lorentz symmetry. 
Turning now to external symmetries, time dilation experiments, like the famous 
Maryland experiment (1975-76), have shown so far no violation of time translation 
effects in the Special theory of relativity. The experiment confirms that no temporal 
symmetry exists for systems in inertial motion with respect to each other. The Lorentz 
transformations measure the quantifiable effects, which the kinematic state of one system 
experiences compared to the kinematic state of another inertial system. They therefore 
show which of the physical changes that can happen to the system remain invariant and 
which ones change in a transition to another reference frame. Just like parity symmetry, 
Lorentz invariance is testable; one of its earliest test occurred in the Michelson-Morley 
experiment. Many other tests have recently been performed and there are suggestions that 
slight deviations from Lorentz invariance may occur on the Planck scale. If the breaking 
of Lorentz symmetry was in fact observable, it would, like CP violations in weak 
interactions, be an indication that Lorentz invariance is an ontological aspect of space-
time at macroscopic levels, rather than a mere epistemological constraint. (Bluhm 2004; 
Kostelecký 2004; Lämmerzahl 2005)  
2) The second argument is that symmetries reflect the fundamental interrelatedness of 
nature. This argument is derived from coherence considerations. There are numerous 
reasons to believe that the universe consists of interrelated systems. These systems 
consist of structures, constituted by relata and relations. At least since the 19th century, 
with its discoveries of atomic structure, entropy, electro-magnetism, and natural 
selection, we think of nature as a system of interrelated subsystems. So we must think of 
theories as representing this interrelatedness via appropriate models. The symmetries play 
an important part in this interrelatedness and its unification.  
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But why should we assume that if the system of relata and relations is confirmed, the 
symmetry principles, which govern these structures are also confirmed? If invariants are 
physically meaningful, it will be surprising if symmetries are merely analytic tools. The 
symmetries tell us more than what the objects and laws tell us. They tell us, which 
quantifiable changes affect the systems and which do not. So they tell us that the 
empirical world is one of interrelated subsystems; the interrelation is subject to 
quantifiable constraints. For if symmetries are immunities to change, this change is not 
just an epistemological change to our knowledge claims. The change happens to physical 
systems. Some physical changes leave parts of the system invariant. Broken symmetries, 
like the violation of parity invariance in weak interactions or cosmological tests of 
Lorentz invariance demonstrate that the immunity is sometimes lifted. But in each case 
we can track the changes that happen to physical systems through our investigations. 
Some changes affect the frame-variant parts of the structures, as in time dilation. Others 
affect what was taken to be the frame-invariant parts, as in broken symmetries.  Those 
who think of symmetries as no more than epistemological constraints, make the mistake 
of thinking that the empirical confirmation of a theory cannot reach the symmetry 
principles. But the tight connection between relata, relations and symmetry principles 
means that the invariants are more than epistemological constraints. The invariants are 
the survivors of the permissible physical changes, which can affect the system. Science 
provides no justification for the arbitrary distinction between relata and relations as 
belonging to reality and external and dynamic symmetries as belonging to epistemology.  
 
VI. Conclusion. These arguments from broken symmetries and coherence support the 
argument that the world consists of structures. We arrived at this conclusion by following 
the route of the invariance view, rather than OSR. We propose that the invariance view is 
a better representation of how knowledge claims map onto the world, because it gives us 
criteria for candidates of the real. While Structural Realism argues from philosophy to 
science and the world, the invariance view argues in the opposite direction, from science 
and the world to philosophy. It has the additional advantage that it brings the importance 
of symmetries to the fore. It also shows, at least for the Special theory of relativity, that 
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structures require the presence of relata (reference frames and coordinate systems in the 
theory of relativity). If an ontological version of Structural Realism is correct, it must 
regard the reality of structures as embracing both the relata and the relations. 
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